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Introduction
The first-year curriculum at American law schools has been remarkably 
stable for more than 100 years. Many would say ossified. At Harvard, the 
First-Year Course of Instruction in 1879-80 consisted of Real Property, 
Contracts, Torts, Criminal Law and Criminal Procedure, and Civil 
Procedure.1 These five courses—focused heavily on judge-made common 
law—dominated Harvard’s 1L curriculum from the law school’s founding 
into the 21st century.2 The same five subjects have long commanded the 
primary attention of first-year students at Fordham, founded in 1905,3 
1. Law SchooL of harvard UniverSity, academic year 1879-80, at 2, 3 (1879).
2. Law SchooL of harvard UniverSity, annoUncementS 1900-01, at 8 (1900); harvard 
UniverSity, the Law SchooL 1920-21, 17 SUppLement to officiaL regiSter of harvard 
UniverSity no. 10, at 2-4 (May 18, 1920); harvard UniverSity, the Law SchooL, incLUding 
coUrSeS of inStrUction for 1940-41, 37 officiaL regiSter of harvard UniverSity no. 29, 
at 8-10 (Apr. 29, 1940); harvard UniverSity, the Law SchooL, cataLogUe for 1960-61, 
57 officiaL regiSter of harvard UniverSity no. 5, 36-38 (Apr. 4, 1960); harvard Law 
SchooL, 1980-81 cataLog 47-49 (1980) [hereinafter 1980-81 Catalog]; harvard Law SchooL, 
harvard Law SchooL cataLog 2000-2001, at 76-82 (2000) [hereinafter 2000-01 Catalog]. 
There have been minor adjustments. By 1920, criminal law had become a one-semester 
course. It was paired in that year with Principles of Liability, but by 1940 it was paired with 
Agency. In the latter part of the 20th century, Harvard added some first-year electives as well 
as a course in Legal Writing, Research and Analysis. See 1980-81 Catalog, supra at 49; 2000-01 
Catalog, supra at 78-82.
3. fordham UniverSity, annoUncement of the SchooL of Law, 1905-06, at 10-11 (July 1905). 
See also fordham UniverSity, SchooL of Law annoUncement 1920-1921, 13 BULLetin of 
information no. 1, at 12-13 (Jan. 1920); the SchooL of Law of fordham UniverSity, 
annoUncement 1940-1941, at 16-17; fordham UniverSity, SchooL of Law 1960-1961, at 
24-25; the SchooL of Law 1980-81, 16 fordham UniverSity BULLetin 11, at 32-33 (1980); 
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and at virtually every other U.S. law school throughout the 20th century.
Starting in the 1990s, however, a growing number of schools have required 
a 1L course examining different aspects of statutes and regulations. In 
previous decades, a handful of law schools offered upper-level elective courses 
in Legislation, including statutory interpretation,4 to a mixed reception.5 
Administrative Law has been a more regular elective subject, although 
enrollments by school reflect an uneven proportion of upper-level students.6 
What is new is the array of law schools deciding that a course in Legislation 
(“Leg”), or Legislation and Regulation (“Leg-Reg”), should be mandatory for 
first-year students.
There are at least 27 schools that require a first-year course in Leg-Reg, 
generally for either three or four credits.7 An additional group of schools 
fordham UniverSity SchooL of Law, StUdent BULLetin 1999-2000, at 24-25 (1999). 
In addition to the five core subjects, Fordham included 1L courses in Agency, Domestic 
Relations, and Jurisprudence though the first half of the past century. By 1980, those 
three additional subjects were no longer part of the 1L curriculum; they were replaced by 
Constitutional Law and Legal Writing.
4. See Albert M. Sacks, Book Review, 5 harv. J. on LegiS. 121 (1967) (noting that legislation 
courses began in law schools in the 1920s and 1930s, and multiplied after World War II). 
Early course listings include BULLetin, UniverSity of SoUthern caLifornia, Law SchooL 
17 (July 1923) (upper-level elective); the Law SchooL, annoUncement of coUrSeS 
1937-1938, BULLetin of the UniverSity of wiSconSin, SeriaL no. 2262, at 22 (Aug. 
1937) (upper-level elective) [hereinafter Wisconsin Bulletin]; the Law SchooL, incLUding 
coUrSeS of inStrUction for the academic year 1950-1951, 47 officiaL regiSter of 
harvard UniverSity no. 8, at 29 (April 1950) (second-year elective); george waShington 
UniverSity, BULLetin, the Law SchooL 1951-52, at 41 (1951) (upper-level elective); BULLetin 
of the UniverSity of SoUthern caLifornia 1952-1954, SchooL of Law, at 21 (1952); Early 
casebooks include, Charles B. Nutting & Shelden D. Elliott, caSeS and materiaLS on 
LegiSLation (West Pub. Co. 1950); Julius Cohen, materiaLS and proBLemS on LegiSLation 
(Bobbs Merrill Co. 2d ed. 1967).
5. Early casebooks and courses focused heavily on the legislative process and lawyering 
connected to that process, although they also covered interpretation of statutes by courts. 
See Sacks, supra note 4, at 122 (raising questions about coherence with respect to Cohen 
casebook); Nutting & Elliott, supra note 4, at xi-xii (setting forth table of contents that 
addresses legislative power, legislative bodies, legislative process, legislative drafting, and 
statutory interpretation); Wisconsin Bulletin, supra note 4. Henry Hart taught his Legislation 
materials, part of the famous Hart & Sacks tentative edition, while a visiting professor at 
Ohio State in the 1954-55 academic year. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, The 
Making of the Legal Process, 107 harv. L. rev. 2031, 2040 (1994). According to a colleague at the 
time, the course was sometimes referred to by students as Darkness at Noon (oral discussion 
between author and Professor Howard Fink in 1992, in which Fink related recollections 
shared earlier by Professor Robert Nordstrom, a friend and colleague of Hart’s).
6. See infra Part IIA. See generally Kevin M. Stack, Lessons from the Turn of the Twentieth Century for First-
Year Courses on Legislation and Regulation, 65 J. LegaL edUc. 28 (2015) (examining and analyzing 
early 20th century resistance to inclusion of administrative law as part of legal education).
7. Based on my polling in February 2014 of Listserv participants in the AALS section on 
Legislation and Law of the Political Process, supplemented by polling conducted among 
members of the Admin Law section listserv in June 2014, the following law schools require 
a 1L course in Leg-Reg (variously titled), with credits listed in parentheses: Cleveland-
5require 1Ls to take Leg, a course that often includes greater focus on topics 
related to the legislative process but does not encompass regulations or the 
regulatory process as a major component.8 Overall, nearly 40 law schools 
currently require some kind of Leg-Reg or Leg course, almost all of them 
as part of the first-year curriculum. The number of schools requiring such a 
course represents a sharp increase within the past decade alone.9
This article focuses on the importance for legal education of mandating such 
a course. Part One addresses three distinct justifications for inserting Leg-Reg 
into the first year of law school. From a pragmatic standpoint, lawyers since 
the New Deal have devoted ever-increasing time and energy to understanding, 
applying, interpreting, litigating, and counseling about statutes and the 
regulations or agency judgments that flow from those statutes. Legal education 
must catch up. Immersing first-year law students in a systematic approach to 
the methodology of statutes and regulations is at least as important to their 
future legal practice as immersing them in the methodology of the common 
law.
In addition, an early exposure to what it means to “think like a lawyer” 
outside the courtroom setting can illuminate and deepen appreciation for our 
three-branch system of government. Courts are the exclusive arbiters of what 
the common law means, and federal courts have become the primary arbiters 
of what the Constitution means as well.10 For statutes, however, the setting is 
Marshall (4), Fordham (4), Harvard (4), Michigan (4), NYU (4), Vanderbilt (4); Brigham 
Young (3), Case Western (3) Colorado (3), Florida State (3), Houston (3), Idaho (3), Maine 
(3), McGeorge (3), New York Law School (3), Ohio Northern (3), Pittsburgh (3), Richmond 
(3), Southern Illinois (3), Texas A&M (3), Vermont (3), West Virginia (3), Widener (3); 
Akron (2), Emory (2), Michigan State (2); Duke (1). In addition, Wake Forest requires such 
a course for 2Ls (3). For comparable data covering the 99 top-ranked law schools, see Abbe 
R. Gluck, The Ripple Effect of “Leg-Reg” on the Study of Legislation & Administrative Law in the Law School 
Curriculum, 65 J. LegaL edUc. 121 (2015).  
8. Schools requiring a 1L course (again differently titled) that covers Statutory Interpretation 
and Legislation include Boston University (3), Chicago-Kent (3), Ohio State (3), and Penn 
State (3). Boston University required Legislation for many years but as of 2015-16, first-
years are required to take Administrative Law instead. Law schools requiring 2Ls to take 
a Statutory Interpretation/Legislation course include Dayton (3) and Mercer (2). Several 
schools (Columbia, UC Irvine, Minnesota) require 1Ls to address Statutory Interpretation 
as a formal component of a separate 1L required course. Another group of schools (American, 
Chicago,  Columbia again, Georgetown, Hofstra and Villanova) include Leg-Reg or Leg on 
a short list of 1L courses from which students must choose one.
9. See Muriel Morisey, Liberating Legal Education From the Judicial Model, 27 Seton haLL LegiS. J. 
231, 268 n.139 (2003) (reporting that eight of 143 American law schools require a course on 
legislation, with no reference to any schools including a regulation component); Gluck, 
supra note 7, at 123 (reporting that 15 of 17 survey respondents with a required course have 
added the course since 2000, and 10 of those 15 since 2010). 
10. See, e.g., Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958). But cf. Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 
U.S. 62, 80-81 (2000) (discussing Congress’ authorization under section 5 of Fourteenth 
Amendment to remedy and deter violation of rights guaranteed under that Amendment); 
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210-11 (1962) (observing that under political question doctrine 
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more complex, reflecting a dynamic conversation among all three branches. By 
requiring first-year students to engage this conversation, law schools generate 
a more balanced set of insights about how our laws are made and applied. 
This, in turn, can help to minimize simplistic dichotomies between principled 
and political decision-making, and encourage students to recognize legislative 
virtues like consensus building and democratic responsiveness as comparable 
to the adversarial legalism of the courtroom.
Finally, statutory and regulatory subjects dominate the upper-level 
curriculum. Accordingly, it makes sense in foundational terms to require 
that students approach these subjects with an understanding of how laws 
and rules are shaped and informed by legislative and regulatory processes. 
A sophisticated methodological background should enable students to focus 
in more rigorous and also nuanced ways when they grapple with finer points 
of securities law, environmental law, or the law of telecommunications or civil 
rights.
Having taught both a required Leg course and a required Leg-Reg course, I 
believe there are solid arguments for each option. My current thinking is that 
Leg-Reg presents the stronger claim, but I will briefly address certain separate 
strengths of a Leg course as well. Whichever option one may consider, a case 
can be made that it borders on educational malpractice not to include either 
Leg-Reg or Leg as a mandatory element of the 1L curriculum.
The fact that a Leg-Reg or Leg course should be required does not mean 
that implementing such a course is straightforward. Part Two discusses some 
challenges that accompany the development of a mandatory Leg-Reg course. 
These include deciding what topics should be covered and how to calibrate 
the emphasis between legislation and regulation; determining how Leg-Reg 
topics may be harmonized with existing subjects, notably Constitutional Law 
and Administrative Law but also Legal Writing and upper-level electives in 
Legislation; and reviewing certain institutional obstacles related to staffing 
a 1L course as well as to persuading colleagues with long-standing, sincere 
investments in their common law subjects to yield some space for a newcomer. 
I. Justifications for a Mandatory 1L Course
A. Preparing for a Legal Career
It has become a commonplace that we live in an age of statutes. By the time 
Guido Calabresi published his celebrated book on the subject in 1982,11 we had 
been denizens for at least half a century. A decade later, the MacCrate Report12 
the constitutionality of political branch decision-making in foreign affairs or national 
security is often nonjusticiable).
11. gUido caLaBreSi, a common Law for the age of StatUteS (1982).
12. Legal Education and Professional Development—an Educational Continuum, Report of the Task Force on Law 
Schools and the Profession: Narrowing the Gap, a.B.a. Sect. of LegaL edUc. & admiSSionS to the 
Bar (July 1992) [hereinafter MacCrate Report].
7noted the striking growth in new areas of law and regulation since the 1950s, 
identifying statutory fields such as “the environment, occupational health and 
safety, nuclear energy, discrimination and individual rights, health and mental 
health care, biotechnology, [and] the development and use of computers.”13
The report also emphasized the expanding areas of transactional practice 
permeated by regulation. These areas often relate to the management 
and control of risks affecting business ventures, including “new business 
formation, mergers and acquisitions, international trade and finance…
consumer protection…[and] tax reforms....”14 Lawyers operating in such 
business settings, replete with state and local as well as federal regulation, 
function more as “transactional engineers”15 than trial or appellate litigators.
In the twenty years since the MacCrate Report, growth in practice fields 
continues to be focused on highly regulated sectors of the economy such 
as telecommunications, securities, banking and finance, food and drugs, 
labor and employment, and tax. American Bar Association data on lawyer 
specialization by practice areas indicates substantial increases in these statute-
dominated fields and others like elder law, immigration, natural resources, 
workers’ compensation, bankruptcy, estates, and criminal law.16
To be sure, disputes involving the meaning of statutes and regulations 
frequently give rise to litigation. As courts continue to interpret and apply 
contested provisions, the role of judges and their core technique of analogical 
reasoning from prior precedent remains important. Precedent, however, often 
carries limited authoritative weight when construing a statute or regulation 
that was purposefully enacted to displace prior law or to fill a gap in the legal 
landscape.17 Instead, lawyers must learn to master additional methodological 
tools, including textual and substantive canons of construction, legislative 
history, consequential considerations linked to fulfillment of underlying 
statutory policies, and the role of legislative acquiescence.18
The pre-eminence of statutory and regulatory law does not mean that 
traditional common law subjects have faded into irrelevance. Parties often 
seek to contract alongside of positive law rights and responsibilities, or even 
to circumvent such rights or responsibilities through written agreements. And 
tort law continues to help shape legal developments in diverse fields including 
13. Id. at 17.
14. Id. at 17, n.12, quoting t.c. fiScher, LegaL edUcation, Law practice, and the economy: 
a new engLand StUdy 77 (1990).
15. Id. 
16. Lawyer SpeciaLty certification By the nUmBerS 1996-2012, a.B.a. nationaL roUndtaBLe 
on Lawyer SpeciaLty certification slides 1, 4 (2013), http://www.americanbar.org/content/
dam/aba/administrative/professional_responsibility/2012_national_certification_census.
authcheckdam.pdf.
17. See Edward Rubin, What’s Wrong with Langdell’s Method and What to Do About It, 60 vand. L. rev. 
609, 620-21 (2007).
18. For further discussion of these factors, see infra Parts IB and IC.
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malpractice, product liability, the environment, and employment. But unlike 
the practice of law in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, these 
common law developments tend to be interstitial to statutes and regulations 
rather than part of a steady or uninterrupted flow of judicial decisions.
Moreover, an increasing number of attorneys practice law while rarely if 
ever appearing in a courtroom. Many work in-house for government agencies 
or serve as counsel for federal, state, or local legislatures. Others lobby on 
behalf of private or nonprofit clients before agencies and legislatures, or 
become inside counsel helping businesses to navigate the regulatory terrain.19
Given these changing circumstances, it is hardly surprising that private law 
practice has become far more focused on statutes and regulations. Lawyers 
advising their business clients with respect to new options or opportunities 
are constantly enmeshed in federal, state, local, and international laws. In 
addition, businesses must react to and navigate the dramatically expanding 
world of corporate compliance. Law firms representing these businesses 
emphasize the need to understand and respond to a range of civil, criminal, 
administrative, and legislative investigations and reporting requirements—
virtually all of which are premised on statutes and regulations.20
A recent survey by the National Conference of Bar Examiners, organized 
in thirteen major fields including administrative law, sought to describe the 
job activities of a newly licensed attorney.21 Respondents who indicated they 
performed tasks in administrative law came mostly from private practice 
(government attorneys were second).22 In addition, attorneys who identified 
with other areas mentioned regulatory work as a major responsibility in their 
field and/or a deficiency in preparedness for new lawyers.23 
19. This range of policy-oriented extrajudicial problem-solving, which occupies much of 
the legal profession, has attracted substantial numbers of female and minority attorneys. 
A smaller percentage of women lawyers than men are in private practice, while a higher 
percentage practice in government, for private associations, or in public interest positions. 
See MacCrate Report, supra note 12, at 20; Employment Patterns 1999-2010, nat’L aSS’n of Law 
pLacement (naLp) (Aug. 2011), http://www.nalp.org/employmentpatterns1999-2010. 
Similar disparities were reported for minority lawyers in the MacCrate Report (at 25-26), 
and subsequently on a more modest scale in the study commissioned by NALP assessing 
employment patterns from 1999 to 2010. See MacCrate Report, supra note 12, at 25-6.
20. To take just a few examples, there are internal compliance and remedial programs structured 
by the SEC and the Justice Department; governance procedures required by Sarbanes-
Oxley; fiduciary responsibilities involving advice given to individual officers and directors; 
investigation of whistleblower claims as well as protections for whistleblowers under a range 
of statutes; and counseling and training for companies on various anti-corruption laws. 
21. See nat’L conf. of Bar examinerS (ncBe), a StUdy of the newLy LicenSed Lawyer, 
ncBe (July 2012). [hereinafter NCBE Study].
22. Id. at 232.
23. Id. at 55-56, 57, 60, 79, 93. For instance, a lawyer from urban Mississippi, engaged in 
intellectual property and mergers-and-acquisitions practice, stated that statutory research 
and regulations, rules, and agency interpretive sources were major responsibilities for newly 
licensed attorneys in those fields, and that entry-level attorneys “need to understand that the 
9Notwithstanding this reality, our law schools have tended to promote 
administrative law as valuable primarily for working inside of government.24 
A Leg-Reg course can encourage first-year law students to recognize that 
all lawyers, including particularly lawyers counseling businesses, need to 
attain a basic familiarity and comfort level with regulatory processes and 
practices. The disconnect between the private profession’s concern to enhance 
regulatory lawyering skills, techniques, and perspectives, and the law schools’ 
frequent anticipation that such skills and perspectives are mainly relevant to 
government work, further illustrates the gap we need to fill.
Although the dramatic shift in the foundations of our law practice and its 
consequences for the job market have been widely recognized, the impact 
on first-year education has been minimal. During that formative first year, 
which signals to students what matters most for their professional futures, we 
continue to “inaccurately treat[] the law suit as the defining event in the legal 
system” while ignoring or undervaluing training in lawyers’ skills as legislative 
policymakers and administrative implementers.25 This reflects in turn a failure 
to appreciate that legislatures and agencies function as lawmaking enterprises 
in ways that are methodologically distinct from courts—distinct but not 
therefore unprincipled or dishonorable. 
Indeed, the 1L experience too often promotes, however subconsciously, 
a false dichotomy between politics and law, compromise and principle, 
a  dichotomy the legal profession has long ceased to accept. In the modern 
era, legal practice requires an ability to utilize skills and integrate mindsets 
associated with legislatures and agencies: the virtues of responsiveness to 
voter policy preferences, regard for interest group participation, deference 
to bureaucratic expertise, and success at consensus building in often-volatile 
circumstances. This ability must coexist alongside the capacity to absorb 
traditional values associated with courts: respect for ideological neutrality, 
clarity, and predictability.26 That Congress at times fails to fulfill some of its 
own virtues, such as democratic responsiveness and consensus building, does 
not define the institution as hopelessly political or unprincipled, any more 
than Supreme Court decisions such as Bush v. Gore27 define that institution as 
hopelessly lawless. 
lawyers exist in a fairly regulated [setting] across government bodies.” Id. at 55. Similarly, an 
experienced antitrust and trade attorney in urban Pennsylvania emphasized the importance 
for new lawyers to know “what does section __ [sic] of the code mean.” Id. at 57. 
24. For example, A Guide to Careers in Administrative Law (2011), drafted by the Office of Public 
Interest Advising at Harvard Law School, focuses almost exclusively on Administrative Law 
being of value for careers in federal, state, or local government, with only passing reference 
made to its relevance for private practice. See id. at 8-32.  
25. Rubin, supra note 17, at 653-54.
26. See Ethan J. Leib, Adding Legislation Courses to the First-Year Curriculum, 58 J. LegaL edUc. 166, 171 
(2008).
27. 531 U.S. 91 (2000). See generally Peter M. Shane, Disappearing Democracy: How Bush v. Gore 
Undermined the Federal Right to Vote for Presidential Electors, 29 fLa. St. U. L. rev. 535 (2001); 
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Exposing first-year students to nonjudicial skills and perspectives on a 
systematic basis will make them more adept at the interpretive and advocacy 
efforts undertaken in an adjudicatory setting. Importantly, as this next section 
discusses, engaging those skills and perspectives also will introduce students at 
an early stage to the complex realities of a legal structure that features separate 
yet interdependent forms of lawmaking.
B. Thinking Like a Lawyer in the Administrative State
It is worth repeating that unlike common law and constitutional law, the 
formation and implementation of statutory law reflects a continuing dialogue 
involving all three institutional branches of government. Effective lawyering 
in this setting requires sensitivity to the techniques and assumptions valued 
in legislative and agency decision-making, and how they differ from judicial 
decision-making. In order to construct or criticize analyses of statutory 
meaning and regulatory implementation, law students must consider the 
distinctive ways in which legislators and agency bureaucrats approach their 
problem-solving responsibilities. And in furtherance of that consideration, 
students require substantial exposure to legislative and administrative “raw 
materials,” taking them well beyond the traditional case-method approach.28 
A Leg-Reg course enables first-year students to explore some of these 
fundamental distinctions. It does so with the goal of establishing a broad-based 
understanding for how statutes and regulations are produced, why courts 
often disagree over their interpretation, and how legislative and administrative 
lawyers may function in this setting. Several examples are illustrative.
What Counts as Reliable Information. In the typical litigation setting presented 
in most first-year courses, courts evaluate factual information offered by the 
parties for its relevance and reliability, using established control mechanisms 
such as the rules of evidence, the swearing of witnesses, and the opportunity 
for cross-examination.29 In a legislative setting, there are no comparable rule-
based controls on the availability of facts or policy information. The legislative 
record developed by Congress leading up to a given statute typically includes 
Pamela S. Karlan, Unduly Partial: The Supreme Court and the Fourteenth Amendment in Bush v. Gore, 
29 fLa. St. U. L. rev. 587 (2001).
28. In this regard, I differ from colleagues who advocate “mak[ing] Leg-Reg appear as much 
like a traditional 1L course as possible, in particular through the use of the case method.” 
John F. Manning & Matthew Stephenson, Legislation & Regulation and Reform of the First Year, 
65 J. LegaL edUc. 45, 51-52 (2015). The case method remains an integral part of Leg-Reg 
pedagogy, but in my view it should be preceded and then complemented by distinctive 
treatment of the lawmaking and regulatory processes. For additional discussion, see infra Part 
IIA. For other pedagogical approaches less heavily devoted to the traditional case method, 
see Dakota S. Rudesill, Christopher J. Walker, & Daniel P. Tokaji, A Program in Legislation, 65 J. 
LegaL edUc. 70 (2015); Deborah A. Widiss, Making Sausage: What, Why, and How to Teach About 
Legislative Process in a Legislation or Leg-Reg Course, 65 J. LegaL edUc. 96 (2015). Compare Stack, 
supra note 6, at 12 (describing how early administrative law courses were “normalized into 
the case method [in order] to gain acceptance.”. 
29. See Morisey, supra note 9, at 240.
11
information generated at committee hearings, presented in committee reports, 
and introduced through floor statements—all without formal institutional 
filters for reliability or relevance.30 At the same time, the segmented structure 
and division of labor within the legislative process means that no individual 
legislator can observe every bill, and only a limited number of legislators can 
be present for any given bill’s deliberative passage through to enactment.31 
Against this background, Leg-Reg students must learn how to assess the 
relevance and value of information developed during and as part of the 
lawmaking process. This in turn entails understanding the organization and 
use of committees within our bicameral system.32 In the absence of like rules 
governing the reliability of legislative “evidence,” lawyers assign relative 
weight to factual assertions, policy arguments, and legal analyses advanced 
through committees and on the floor.33 
The reference to “lawyers assigning relative weight” encompasses a number 
of separate legal contexts of which students should be aware. Legislators 
and their staffs often consider committee report materials ex ante as a source 
of information and possible persuasion for anticipated floor proceedings.34 
Later, many agencies will regard the reports as offering guidance on early 
implementation and enforcement of the new law,35 and regulated businesses 
may find clarification and instruction as to how the new statute should apply. 
Still later, judges reviewing statutory disputes may derive insight into the 
meaning of provisions that are inconclusive on their face.36
30. In addition, the staff for committee and individual legislators typically receive and often 
benefit from information (solicited and unsolicited) supplied by interest group lobbyists, 
executive agencies, and research divisions within Congress. See generally Morisey at 240-41; 
Cohen, supra note 4, at 402-03.
31. See henry m. hart Jr. & aLBert m. SackS, the LegaL proceSS: BaSic proBLemS in the 
making and appLication of Law 696 (William N. Eskridge Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 
1994).
32. See id. at 706-10; roBert a. katzmann, JUdging StatUteS 13-20 (2014). The value of 
information amassed in the regulatory process is similarly shaped by distinct practices 
associated with rulemaking and other agency efforts to develop guidance or advice, 
practices to which Leg-Reg students are introduced. See, e.g., Rybachek v. EPA, 904 F.2d 
1276, 1286 (9th Cir. 1990) (addressing agency’s use of after-acquired information in notice-
and-comment rulemaking process); United States v. Nova Scotia Food Products Corp., 568 
F.2d 240, 252 (2d Cir. 1977) (addressing agency’s obligations to respond in some detail to 
material questions or concerns regarding a proposed rule, obligations less structured than 
those imposed for judicial trials).
33. Viewed from this perspective, the textualist position that evidence developed during the 
legislative process is essentially inadmissible to help explain the meaning of an enacted law 
reflects a misapprehension of the legislative model.
34. See generally Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation From the Inside—An 
Empirical Study of Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part I, 65 Stan. L. rev. 901 (2013); Victoria 
Nourse & Jane Schacter, The Politics of Legislative Drafting: A Congressional Case Study, 77 n.y.U. L. 
rev. 575 (2002).
35. See generally Christopher J. Walker, Inside Agency Interpretation, 67 Stan. L. rev. 999 (2015).
36. katzmann, supra note 32, at 35.
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Evaluative screening of legislative record evidence is not as formalized and 
rule-oriented as the monitoring of facts or precedent in a common law litigation 
setting. But this less uniform approach contains its own set of standards 
and presumptions, tied to the structure of congressional lawmaking.37 By 
examining that structure, first-year students will begin to appreciate how to 
perceive or infer in comparatively objective terms the persuasive value of such 
evidence. 
What Counts as Authority. Common law courses focus on judicial precedents as 
primary sources of authority. Departure from these precedents is incremental, 
with due regard for lawyers’ obligations to support their claims and arguments 
under existing legal principles.38 By contrast, Leg-Reg addresses how law 
created through statute and subsequent agency implementation aims to 
change the status quo in non-incremental ways. Congress does not always 
legislate to create whole new fields of legal policy. In numerous settings, it 
builds on prior statutes when enacting new ones; examples include successive 
accretions in our employment discrimination laws, our antitrust laws, and our 
environmental laws.39 But even these accretions tend to reflect substantial and 
unanticipated public policy priorities and/or interest group agendas rather 
than a commitment to utilize case law precedents as basic guideposts.
As part of their greater freedom in departing from the status quo, 
legislatures and agencies rely on a diverse menu of formats when generating 
lawmaking controls. Courts addressing a particular controversy typically 
resolve the meaning of a legal rule or standard in explicit case-specific terms 
that are then authoritative until the next opportunity arises for case-specific 
incremental change. But when deciding how best to assert its authority 
in a particular subject matter field, Congress may choose from a range of 
37. See James J. Brudney, Canon Shortfalls and the Virtues of Political Branch Interpretive Assets, 98 caL. 
L. rev. 1199, 1225-27 (2010) (discussing standards for reliability of legislative history based 
on the best evidence of consensus within the legislature that can be routinely discerned, 
or evidence deemed to have been noticed, understood, and endorsed by a reasonable 
legislator).
38. See Morisey, supra note 9, at 243-44 (discussing Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 11(b)(2) 
and Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 3.1 as reinforcing the limits imposed by 
precedent).
39. For employment discrimination laws, see Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Pub. L. No. 88-
352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964) (codified as amended in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2014)) and subsequent 
changes by the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 
103 (1972); Pregnancy Discrimination Act, Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (1978); Civil 
Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991); and Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay 
Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5 (2009); Antitrust law via Sherman Act, 26 Stat. 
209 (1890) (codified as amended in 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2004)); Clayton Act, Pub. L. 63-212, 
38 Stat. 730 (1914) (codified as amended in 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27, 29 U.S.C. §§ 52-53 (2014); 
Robinson-Patman Act, Pub. L. No. 74-692, 49 Stat. 1526 (1936) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 13 
(2014)); Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, Pub. L. 94-435, 90 Stat. 
1383 (1976); for Environmental law see Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1948, 62 Stat. 
1155 (1948) and subsequent amendments, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (1972); Pub. L. 
95-217, 91 Stat. 1566 (1977) (codified as amended in 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2014)).
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lawmaking approaches, including direct coercion, incentives to private actors, 
and regulatory delegation.40
A Leg-Reg course can examine how these choices reflect in part the 
open-ended nature of the legislative process, where achieving sufficient 
consensus to enact a statute requires a complex blend of problems, policies, 
and politics.41 Thus, Congress may authorize public enforcers to prosecute 
violators of the statute and exact some penalty from them through criminal 
statutes. Alternatively (or additionally), Congress may authorize private 
victims of unlawful conduct, or an agency official acting on their behalf, to 
sue the violators for civil damages and/or injunctive relief as well as attorney’s 
fees. Finally, the legislature can delegate the development of standards, the 
adjudication of violations, and the promulgation of guidance to a public 
administrative agency. 
The first two implementation choices allow courts to assist directly in 
developing statutory meaning through interpretive standards and rules. 
For this reason, Leg-Reg courses typically devote considerable time and 
emphasis to statutory interpretation. The interpretive approaches, however, 
involve less independence than judicial decision-making under common law. 
They are subject to the formal controls of legislative override42 and agency 
nonacquiescence,43 and the indirect constraints of legislative disapproval 
through oversight or appropriations activity44 and agency evasion through 
strategic choices.45 
The third implementation option, delegation to an administrative agency, 
is also a major focus of Leg-Reg treatment, as it has become increasingly 
characteristic of the modern administrative state at both the federal and 
state levels. Although courts may review the exercise of this delegated power, 
the sheer breadth and scope of agency action makes such review of minor 
40. See hart & SackS, supra note 31, at 845-57 (discussing these three distinct approaches).
41. See John w. kingdon, agendaS, aLternativeS and pUBLic poLicieS 87-88 (2d ed. 1995).
42. See Matthew R. Christiansen & William N. Eskridge, Jr., Congressional Overrides of Supreme Court 
Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 1967-2011, 92 tex. L. rev. 1317 (2014) (reporting on frequency 
of overrides, especially in certain areas like criminal law and civil rights). 
43. See Samuel Estreicher & Richard L. Revesz, Nonacquiescence by Federal Administrative Agencies, 98 
yaLe L.J. 679, 705-12 (1988) (discussing the venue-uncertain conditions under which the 
NLRB operates where administrative law judges follow precedents established by the Board 
unless reversed by the Supreme Court).
44. See generally Baraka v. McGreevey 481 F.3d 187, 203 (3d Cir. 2007) (declining to award 
payment of $10,000 honorarium for statutorily created position because legislature never 
appropriated funds for payment of the amount provided for under authorizing statute); see 
also Green v. C.I.R., 507 F.3d 857, 863 n.4 (5th Cir. 2007) (concluding that under Texas law, 
“the legislature may choose, through the appropriation process to pay all, some, or none of 
an individual’s judgment against the state.”).
45. See generally Yehonantan Givati, Strategic Statutory Interpretation by Administrative Agencies, 12 am. L. 
& econ. rev. 95, 96, 114 (2010); M. Elizabeth Magill, Agency Choice of Policymaking Forum, 71 U. 
chi. L. rev. 1383, 1395-1403 (2004).
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importance in the larger lawmaking picture46 Most of the time, agency 
actions are either unreviewed by courts or essentially unreviewable. Thus, the 
authority-creating options available to agencies are more complex and varied 
than what legislatures employ, and far more so than the case method utilized 
by courts.
When students learn about separation of powers in Constitutional Law, the 
concepts typically are presented through a focus on the substantive authority 
exercised by and constraints imposed upon each branch of national government. 
The Leg-Reg approach to separation of powers focuses more directly on the 
untethered agendas and diverse procedural mechanisms through which the two 
politically accountable branches make law. Moreover, by exploring separation 
of powers doctrines through Supreme Court decisions, Constitutional Law 
courses subtly reinforce the 1L message that the finality and principled nature 
of “law” derives from and evolves through the judiciary. A required exposure 
to the processes by which legislatures and agencies modify the status quo, 
processes that also are principled and final, will allow first-year law students to 
develop an appreciation for how lawmaking is a genuine tripartite enterprise, 
one in which courts often play a subordinate role. 
Teaching law students to respect the richness and diversity of lawmaking 
methodologies as part of their baseline legal education might even yield 
ancillary dividends with a larger audience, given the legal profession’s role 
in helping to shape public attitudes towards the politically accountable 
branches. Congress and many state legislatures assuredly have a poor public 
image, and this is in part well-earned. The public’s low opinion, however, 
also relates to the cacophonous transparency and messiness of legislative 
operations, which are easy targets for skeptical media coverage in contrast to 
the secretive, presumptively orderly judicial decision-making enterprise. If the 
next generation of attorneys is trained to recognize that these messy, noisy 
democratic processes have a foundation of coherence and on occasion even 
elegance, and to explore their special lawmaking qualities as distinct from the 
adjudication of legal disputes, newly minted graduates will be in a position to 
promote a more balanced perspective on the effectiveness of the nonjudicial 
branches.
 What Counts as Successful Advocacy. In order for lawyers to become effective 
professional advocates, they must understand that the approach of a litigator 
differs in important respects from what is called for in legislative and 
administrative law practice.47 For a start, legislative and regulatory decision-
makers are not expected to be neutral in the way that judges are. Voters elect 
46. A Leg-Reg course explores the range of options available to agencies when exercising their 
law-implementing authority. These options include formal and informal rulemaking and 
adjudication, but also interpretive rules, policy guidance, and processes with less than 
general applicability such as opinion letters or advisory statements. See generally hart & 
SackS, supra note 31, at 1060-61; Nina Mendelson, Regulatory Beneficiaries and Informal Agency 
Policymaking, 92 corneLL L. rev. 397 (2006).
47. See Morisey, supra note 9, at 236-38, 246-63 for in-depth treatment of this issue.
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legislators, and elected executives appoint top agency officials, based on 
their ideological values and policy preferences. While we presume agencies 
will follow certain procedural norms that are “neutral” in the sense of even-
handed and fair, they are not expected to be disinterested but rather to act 
cooperatively with political leaders of government.48
Legislative and administrative practice lawyers representing non-
governmental clients advocate for some form of public policy result before 
these politically interested bodies. In doing so, they are less bound to the 
zero-sum litigation model in which one side “wins” and the other side “loses.” 
Leg-Reg students are encouraged to consider how an attorney for an industry 
that emits pollutants (or some other business venture) may oppose a specific 
legislative or regulatory approach while accepting the need for a regulatory 
solution. The posture of most legislative or regulatory proposals allows for, 
if it does not invite, give-and-take and compromise as part of the lawmaking 
process.49 It would generally be unwise for a private party lawyer to view 
the legislature or the agency regulator as an opponent in the same way that 
plaintiffs and defendants in court are opponents.50
Relatedly, issue-framing in litigation demands tailoring the scope of the legal 
question with a judge or jury in mind, so as to make the law apply readily in 
a client’s favor. Framing issues in legislative and regulatory advocacy requires 
lawyers to articulate a problem and propose remedies that evoke widely held 
values or beliefs linked to broad public policy positions. This more expansive 
framing approach is directed at an audience that is correspondingly broader 
than legal decision-makers inside the courtroom. For legislative lawyering, 
the audience includes not only legislators but different private or public 
constituencies and also the media.51 For regulatory lawyering, the audience 
consists of agency policymakers, who are scientists and economists as well 
as attorneys. In both instances, lawyers must understand the importance of 
becoming nimble and articulate about issues that go well beyond how to 
interpret and apply the current state of legal precedent or authority.  
48. See Peter L. Strauss, Administrative Law: The Hidden Comparative Law Course, 46 J. LegaL edUc. 
478, 488 (1996).
49. With respect to legislation, that give-and-take may arise prior to bill introduction, as when 
the major premise of according new rights or protections to a large group of citizens (such 
as consumers or employees) is combined with a minor premise of defenses or exemptions 
that reduce or immunize business liability in certain settings. Compromise also may occur 
during the post-introduction enactment process on a particular issue or provision, reflecting 
accommodations deemed necessary by proponents in order to achieve sufficient consensus 
for final passage.
50. See Morisey, supra note 9, at 248.
51. See id., at 249-50. One famous example is President Lyndon Johnson’s appeals (in which he 
was joined by leading congressional lawmakers) to civil rights and labor leaders, religious 
groups, and the general public to help enact the 1964 Civil Rights Act. See, e.g., roBert 
caro, the paSSage of power: the yearS of Lyndon JohnSon  488-92 (2012);  wiLLiam n. 
eSkridge, Jr. et aL., caSeS and materiaLS on LegiSLation and regULation StatUteS and 
the creation of pUBLic poLicy 9 (5th ed. 2014).
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In sum, legal education in the creation and application of public law 
should encourage an appreciation for distinctly nonjudicial policymaking 
procedures and dynamics. These include the informational record from which 
laws and regulations are constructed; the minimal role played by respect for or 
adherence to the status quo; and the wide-ranging approaches to advocating 
for change in the status quo. Early systematic exposure to thinking like a 
lawyer outside the courtroom will contribute to a richer and more balanced 
first-year experience. As the next section indicates, it also will create a stronger 
foundation for upper-level studies that focus on statutes and regulations. 
C. Preparing for the Rest of Law School 
When examining practical and doctrinal justifications for a 1L Leg-Reg 
course, my focus has been on benefits obtained by first-year students from 
taking the subject. But upper-level students and professors in other courses 
also will derive important advantages from this requirement. Developing an 
in-depth understanding about the formulation and implementation of statutes 
and regulations allows for a more fine-grained and sophisticated approach to 
the array of follow-on regulatory courses. 
This understanding cannot be conveyed interstitially by professors teaching 
other 1L courses.52 In addition to the focus on common law methodologies 
and a felt need to cover substantive doctrine, many of these courses have 
experienced a reduced number of credits to make room for other subjects 
besides Leg-Reg.53 Nor can the topics and perspectives discussed earlier in this 
part be readily integrated through piecemeal detours undertaken by professors 
teaching upper-level substantive subjects. Instead, courses like employment 
discrimination, environmental law, or financial institutions will be enriched 
when entering students have examined in comprehensive terms the role of 
certain basic interpretive resources as well as key aspects of the regulatory 
process. Several examples again help to illustrate the point.
Legislative history. Since Justice Scalia joined the Court, judges and scholars 
have debated whether Congress’ pre-enactment legislative record should 
be deemed relevant to ascertain the specific intent of key supporters or the 
more general purposive meaning of a statute. Heated disagreements between 
textualists and purposivists have focused on to what extent legislators’ 
descriptions of and justifications for provisions of a bill in progress are 
a legitimate source for lawyers and judges to invoke during litigation over 
52. See Todd D. Rakoff, The Harvard First-Year Experiment, 39 J. LegaL edUc. 491, 492 (1989) 
(describing challenges confronting a first-year reform effort at Harvard in the 1980s that 
included a “mini-course” in courts, legislatures, and statutes, and observing that “the 
premises of the first-year curriculum—its division of the world by common-law rubrics; its 
reliance on the case method; even its pedagogical form of many students, one teacher—
would limit what could successfully be achieved within it.”).
53. See Leib, supra note 26, at 173 (discussing addition of Constitutional Law, Legal Writing, and 
Moot Court).
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the enacted text.54 These disagreements, and in some instances Congress’ 
legislative responses, have influenced the interpretation of federal statutes in 
every major regulatory field. There has been comparable discourse among 
judges and legislators at the state level, where legislative history has been 
influential although less scrutinized by legal scholars.55 Devoting time in 
Leg-Reg to examining how courts assign greater or lesser weight to different 
kinds of legislative history, and why some judges find this history entirely 
inadmissible, yields dividends for many other courses focused on substantive 
law.
Outside of litigation, agency bureaucrats and regulated entities often pay 
careful attention to Congress’ pre-enactment legislative record.56 The value 
of committee reports for nonjudicial audiences is likely enhanced when the 
reports are produced in a bipartisan, objective manner. This is often the 
case, for instance, with respect to reports accompanying major tax reform 
legislation.57 Tax committee reports have been described as performing a mini-
regulatory function in situations when the Treasury Department takes years to 
issue formal rules on specific topics covered under the new law.58 
In short, it is important that students be able to understand legislative 
history in a systematic way and to examine it in critical terms. By appreciating 
how such history has variable probative value in a litigation setting and also 
beyond the courtroom, students are better equipped to analyze its use or 
misuse in the development of substantive law doctrines. 
Canons. Here too, students need a well-ordered and comprehensive 
approach. One can imagine spending time on the Rule of Lenity in Criminal 
Law, but students in that course are likely to focus heavily if not exclusively on 
the substantive problem or case being used as a vehicle. Similarly, the canon of 
Constitutional Avoidance may be addressed by constitutional law professors, 
but only as a parenthetical to high profile doctrinal issues, as when examining 
the Court’s recent review of challenges to the Affordable Care Act.59 
By contrast, Leg-Reg treatment of these canons involves asking broad 
methodological questions that are both distinct from specific substantive 
54. See, e.g., Bank One Chicago, N.A. v. Midwest Bank & Trust Co., 516 U.S. 264, 276-83 (1996) 
(Stevens, J. concurring, debating with Scalia, J., concurring); Wisconsin Pub. Intervenor 
v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 610-12 n.4, 616-23 (White, J., writing for the Court, debating with 
Scalia, J. concurring). See generally katzmann, supra note 32, at 35-49.
55. See Abbe R. Gluck, The States as Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation: Methodological Consensus and the 
New Modified Textualism, 119 yaLe L.J. 1750 (2009).
56. See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
57. See James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, The Warp and Woof of Statutory Interpretation: Comparing 
Supreme Court Approaches in Tax Law and Workplace Law, 58 dUke L.J. 1231, 1282 (2008).
58. See Michael A. Livingston, Congress, the Courts, and the Code: Legislative History and the Interpretation 
of Tax Statutes, 69 tex L. rev 819, 841 (1990).
59. See National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (Roberts, 
C.J.).
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law examples and informative with respect to application in future contested 
settings. For instance, is the Rule of Lenity best justified as providing fair 
warning to citizens? As vindicating the presumptive requirement of mens rea 
for criminal penalties? As imposing constraints on prosecutorial power and 
judicial discretion?60 Whatever rationales are deemed appropriate by lawyers 
or judges in a particular context, there are further choices as to how a reviewing 
court may frame its reliance on the canon. Should the rule be invoked as a 
tiebreaker at the back end of the interpretive process, reserved for situations in 
which a judge regards the two parties’ competing interpretations as essentially 
in equipoise? Or is the rule better understood as a presumption invoked at 
the front end of the process, inviting the other side to overcome it through 
sufficiently persuasive support for the contrary interpretation?61
Similarly, the constitutional avoidance canon might support a number of 
different values. A court may be respecting legislative rationality by assuming 
there was no intent to press constitutional limits. Alternatively, a court may be 
preserving its own institutional capital by declining to confront the prospect 
of legislative invalidation. Finally, the avoidance canon may be a backdoor 
way for a court to give effect to underenforced constitutional norms.62 Law 
students’ ability to understand how the canon has been applied to shed light 
on a statute’s meaning may depend on which values they believe were deemed 
prominent, and—for the underenforced norms rationale—how strongly they 
believe the judge or agency was committed to the norm in question.63
Cost-Benefit Analysis. Torts courses often treat the cost-benefit issue in 
connection with their discussion of particular judicial efforts to allocate risks 
between plaintiffs and defendants. During the past several decades, this 
subject area has assumed considerable importance in the regulatory context 
based on initiatives by presidents from both parties. Acting through the Office 
of Management and Budget and its Office of Information and Regulatory 
Affairs, the White House has made cost-benefit analysis a linchpin for its 
structured efforts at ex ante monitoring of agency rulemaking. 
60. eSkridge et aL., supra note 51, at 694-95.
61. See id. at 693. The Court was closely divided over this framing question in Muscarello v. 
United States, 524 U.S. 125, 138-39, 148-49 (1998) (comparing Justice Breyer’s majority 
opinion using tiebreaker approach with Justice Ginsburg’s dissenting opinion using 
presumption approach).
62. See eSkridge et aL., supra note 51, at 726-27. 
63. For a recent example of the avoidance canon being invoked to vindicate privacy-based rights, 
see Fair Housing Authority of San Fernando Valley v. Roommate.com LLC, 666 F.3d 1216 
(9th Cir. 2012). Further, as with the example of the Rule of Lenity, lawyers and judges must 
decide how to frame their approach to the avoidance canon. Should one first decide that 
there is a fair or reasonable alternative statutory interpretation that will avoid the possible 
constitutional question? Or should one start by determining whether the constitutional 
question to be avoided is itself serious or substantial? If the latter approach is followed, 
does seriousness depend on the fundamental nature of the constitutional provision being 
implicated? On the likelihood that the provision has been violated? See eSkridge et aL., 
supra note 51, at 726.
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Leg-Reg coverage allows first-year students to explore various technical 
issues related to cost-benefit analysis. This includes modern techniques for 
the valuation of economic benefits but also aspects incorporated in recent 
executive orders such as the role of non-monetizable benefits and the need 
to determine whether benefits “justify” as opposed to “outweigh” costs.64 
A Leg-Reg approach also invites students to consider related legal issues, 
notably Congress’ choice to prohibit, permit, or require cost-benefit analysis 
in particular statutory schemes, and how aggressive or deferential judicial 
review should be in an area involving highly technical economic models 
and assumptions.65 Finally, Leg-Reg treatment can address the political 
dimensions of interagency coordination and conflict over cost-benefit analysis, 
an issue that highlights tensions between the White House and the agency 
bureaucracy.66 In sum, as is the case for legislative history and the canons, 
the Leg-Reg course offers a systematic overview on the weighing of costs 
and benefits in agency rulemaking that implicates a broad set of institutional 
values and relationships, going well beyond what would be addressed in a 
case-specific or substantive law setting. 
II. Challenges to Developing a Mandatory 1L Course
It is not an accident that the first-year curriculum has remained substantially 
intact for over a century. There are the familiar bromides about not tinkering 
with the best part of legal education, not shoehorning all important subjects 
into the first year, and not repeating failed experiments from the past.67 On 
this last point, one recurring argument has been that students often give low 
evaluations to Leg or Leg-Reg courses, and their level of dissatisfaction then 
discourages professors from embracing or sticking with the course.68 
While student concerns deserve to be taken seriously as a general matter, 
it is not clear that they should influence faculty commitment in this setting. 
The concerns tend to relate to what students rightly perceive as the unfamiliar 
aspects of Leg-Reg—it is methodological rather than doctrinal, and focused 
less on courts than all other 1L courses. But the lack of familiarity and related 
discomfort are an important part of the reason students need to be exposed 
to the subject at an early stage.69 In addition, as an increasing number of 
law schools require the course, and students perceive their first-year friends 
64. See Exec. Order No. 12866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51735 (Oct. 4, 1993) (discussing in Section 1(b)(6) 
the key question of whether benefits “justify” costs); Exec. Order No. 13563, 78 Fed. Reg. 
3821 (Jan. 21, 2011) (authorizing in Section 1(c) agencies to consider values impossible to 
quantify such as equity, dignity, and fairness).
65. See eSkridge et aL., supra note 51, at 1025-31.
66. See generally Cass Sunstein, The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs: Myths and Realities, 126 
harv. L. rev. 1838 (2012).
67. See Leib, supra note 26, at 178-81.
68. Id. at 174.
69. The reasons have been amply discussed in Part I.
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elsewhere to be in their same position, the “strangeness” factor is likely to 
diminish. Finally, as professors become more comfortable teaching what is 
for many of them a different kind of course than they have taught in the past, 
student responses should also adjust. Data from several law schools indicates 
that student evaluations of required first-year courses in Leg-Reg and Leg are 
consistent with evaluations for other 1L subjects.70
Beyond overcoming student discomfort and associated professorial 
reluctance, it is worth considering a range of issues that faculties and 
administrators may face when seeking to add Leg-Reg to the 1L curriculum. 
Some are tailored to the particular content of Leg-Reg; others apply to the 
insertion of any new 1L requirement.71 What follows are responses, necessarily 
abbreviated in this context, to concerns that may be raised under each heading.
A. Concerns Specific to Leg-Reg 
Structure of the Course. An unusual dimension of the Leg-Reg course is its 
combination of two related yet distinct subject areas. Leg is often presented 
as largely methodological, whereas Reg includes more traditionally doctrinal 
elements borrowed principally from Administrative Law.72 The existence of 
these potentially separable components invites more attention to organizational 
aspects of the course. There are now a number of casebooks offering different 
ways to integrate the two parts. The following observations, while not meant 
to be rigidly prescriptive, suggest certain guideposts. 
First-year students tend to have little recollection of how laws are made and 
little or no knowledge about regulations. Accordingly, starting the course with 
70. At Fordham, where Leg-Reg has been a required 1L course since 2011-12, the Leg-Reg mean 
evaluations are in the middle of the pack for first-year courses; they also have risen steadily 
for professors teaching the course in each of its first three years. At Harvard, where Leg-Reg 
has been required since 2007-08, course evaluations are similarly located midstream when 
compared with other required 1L subjects. At Ohio State, the Leg evaluations were middle 
of the pack among 1L course composite records for the past two academic years, 2012-13 and 
2013-14. Student evaluation composite records for the three law schools are on file with the 
author; they are anonymous as to individual professor identities. 
71. Some observers may also contend that Leg-Reg (or Leg) could be required in the fall semester 
of second year, which would avoid destabilizing existing 1L arrangements. A requirement 
in the second year is preferable to no requirement at all, although others may object to 
imposing further mandates beyond the first year. But given the well-recognized formative 
and signaling qualities of the initial law school year, a Leg-Reg course should become part 
of this core intellectual experience. Indeed, an important function of such a required course 
is precisely to destabilize long-settled arrangements that have unduly exalted the common 
law and judge-centered approach to legal education.
72. A comparable dichotomy between methodological and substantive law topics also arises 
in a Leg course. Exposure to the way Congress makes laws has substantive dimensions, 
and distinct legislative process components such as lobbying, redistricting, speech or 
debate clause immunity, and campaign finance are plainly doctrinal. These distinct process 
components are often part of a basic Leg course. See Rudesill et al., supra note 28, at 78-84 
[Part IB] (discussing pedagogical approaches to law of the political process). When Leg is 
part of a Leg-Reg course, faculty often focus primarily on statutory interpretation, though 
with some introductory material on the lawmaking process. 
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an orientation to fundamentals of the lawmaking process is important. Students, 
especially those whose college majors were in the sciences or humanities, are 
often puzzled or anxious about revisiting a topic they last contemplated in 
high school. And a 1L course that begins by focusing for several classes on 
Congress rather than case law analysis may initially reinforce this discomfort. 
Yet there is little prospect for constructively and critically examining what 
legislatures produce without becoming “up close and personal” with the 
process that yields those statutory products. Encouraging students in the first 
week to appreciate that the role of statutes is more central than their truncated 
recital in appellate court footnotes suggests will start to reorient their thinking 
for the entire semester.73 An initial exposure to the legislative process should 
also include an introduction to agencies and the different ways they contribute 
to implementation.74 This allows 1Ls to begin perceiving how the two political 
branches interact to make the rule of law effective.
In addition to the lawmaking process itself, there are a series of “core 
areas” that, if possible, should be part of the Leg-Reg course. These areas 
include theories of statutory interpretation (notably textualism, purposivism, 
dynamic interpretation); related practical tools of statutory interpretation 
(canons, dictionaries, legislative history, legislative inaction, stare decisis); 
threshold operational questions about agencies (such as delegation from 
Congress and removal powers of the president); agency process options for 
implementation (related to the Administrative Procedure Act); approaches 
to the oversight or monitoring of agencies (ex ante by the executive branch 
and ex post by Congress and the courts); and judicial deference to agencies as 
part of statutory interpretation. The last area mentioned—agency deference—is 
especially valuable as a final unit, because it combines Leg and Reg and builds 
73. My first reading assignment includes a review of initial Republican and Democratic versions 
of the bills that became Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. In an opening class discussion, 
students invariably do a thoughtful job debating the general pros and cons for courts using 
legislative history to illuminate statutory meaning—they focus impressively on questions of 
legitimacy, reliability and efficiency. But when then asked to review and analyze actual bill 
language, there is often prolonged silence punctuated by the deer-in-the-headlights look of 
incomprehension. Getting students to identify and analyze competing statutory formulations as to 
the compensation and tenure schemes for EEOC members, or enforcement and remedial 
approaches under proposed Title VII, is comparable to getting them to understand 
differences among holding, dicta, and reasoning at the start of a common law course. On 
the second day of class, students review the eight pages of the House floor debate that led 
to inclusion of the sex discrimination amendment. The fact that this amendment—covering 
many millions more Americans than the central race discrimination provisions of Title VII—
was introduced by Southern Democrats as a “poison pill,” was opposed by the bill managers 
from both parties on strategic and sincere grounds, and was approved as an amendment with 
crucial outspoken support from a handful of female members, is invariably eye-opening for 
students and triggers animated discussion.
74. One can rely on an extended case study to present this introductory material, as the Eskridge, 
Frickey, Garrett & Brudney casebook does using Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. (see 
supra note 51, at 2-36, 61-79) Alternatively, the overview might be presented through one or 
more problem-solving opportunities, or perhaps in lecture format. 
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on students’ accumulated understandings about both the legislature and the 
bureaucracy.
With respect to a Leg course that does not address the regulatory process, 
there is more leeway to explore important and engaging aspects of the 
legislative process beyond lawmaking per se. Topics frequently covered (and 
worthy of examination) include immunity under the Speech or Debate Clause, 
lobbying and bribery, campaign finance and its regulation consistent with the 
First Amendment, electoral redistricting, and direct democracy. Apart from 
their intrinsic interest as part of a separation of powers orientation, each of 
these areas can enhance student insights into factors that affect—or distort—the 
time and energy legislators spend on lawmaking activities.
Coordinating with Other Subjects, 1L and Upper-Level. The Leg-Reg course 
addresses, from its own distinctive angle of vision, a number of issues that may 
be covered in other courses as well. Accordingly, Leg-Reg professors should 
reach out to faculty in these other areas to avoid unnecessary duplication or 
unintended gaps. With respect to Constitutional Law, Leg-Reg faculty will 
likely wish to cover nondelegation and the president’s powers to appoint 
and remove agency personnel, though probably not the line-item veto and 
possibly not the legislative veto if it is covered in depth by constitutional law 
professors. Assuming that both Leg-Reg and Con Law are required, and that 
students will often take these two courses in the same semester of the first 
year, a commitment to coordinate decisions about specific areas of coverage is 
important.75
With regard to Administrative Law, an upper-level elective course, 
coordination challenges are more complex. In terms of topics to be covered, 
Leg-Reg professors might decide to introduce the basic agency implementation 
options (formal and informal rulemaking, adjudication, interpretive rules, 
policy guidance) as well as judicial review under the APA and agency 
deference under Chevron and Skidmore, while eschewing in-depth treatment of 
these matters and avoiding altogether other topics such as adjudicatory due 
process, ripeness and exhaustion, standing, implied rights of action, and the 
Freedom of Information Act. The problem is that for many students this 
may be their only exposure to the subject. Administrative Law occupies an 
important place in the upper-level curriculum of most law schools, but it is not 
a required course and actual enrollments vary considerably between schools 
and from one year to the next.76 
75. For example, if—unknown to the professors involved—the same 1L section is assigned 
Immigration & Naturalization Service v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983), for Constitutional 
Law one week and for Leg-Reg the following week, students may be puzzled by the 
repetitive or divergent perspectives, and by depletion of the scarce resource of 1L class time.
76. Annual enrollment at Harvard has ranged from 191 to 413 students since 2006-07 (out 
of approximately 1,600 total upper-level students). Enrollment has varied from 20 to 115 
students at Fordham since 2008-09 (out of an average of approximately 800 total upper-level 
students), from 32 to 140 students at Vanderbilt since 2005-06 (out of an average upper-
level student population of 380) and from 115 to 188 students at Columbia since 2009-10 
(out of approximately 900 upper-level students). Data for these four law schools are on file 
23
This raises the question whether to introduce students to Reg topics with 
the expectation they will return to the subject in the subsequent specialized 
course. One can imagine two scenarios developing after Leg-Reg is established 
as a 1L requirement. Some students will conclude that their exposure to Reg 
makes it unnecessary or excessive to revisit the subject area in a separate full 
course: a “been there, done that” mindset. Other students, intrigued by the 1L 
presentation of Reg issues, will decide to pursue an in-depth exploration of the 
subject: a “whetted appetite” mindset. Data collected from three law schools 
with a 1L Leg-Reg requirement indicate that administrative law enrollments 
have declined at some institutions; whether this is due to the presence of Leg-
Reg or other factors is not entirely clear.77
Any diminution in Administrative Law enrollment should be viewed 
alongside the fact that the entire student body is now experiencing a substantial 
Reg component as 1Ls. At Fordham, for instance, the numbers enrolled in 
Administrative Law in the three years prior to Leg-Reg averaged under 20 
percent of all upper-level students.78 Having 100 percent take a course that 
includes basics of Administrative Law may be deemed worth the trade-off of 
with the author. Even students who do not take the course may find that they are tested in 
Administrative Law on their state bar examination. See, e.g., new york State Board of Law 
examinerS, content oUtLine for the new york State Bar exam 1 (Aug. 2014), http://
www.nybarexam.org/Docs/contentoutline.pdf (testing for state administrative law starting 
February 2015); oregon State Board of Bar examinerS, oregon Bar exam SUBJect 
matter SUmmary chart (including state and federal Administrative Law as a subject since 
2009), http://www.osbar.org/_docs/admissions/SubjectSummaryChart.pdf. See generally 
Rudesill et al., supra note 28, at footnote 13 (listing 10 states that test administrative law as an 
essay subject on the bar exam).
77. At Fordham, the average Administrative Law enrollment declined by more than half between 
the four academic years preceding Leg-Reg and the first two academic years following its 
introduction. At Vanderbilt, the decline in average Administrative Law enrollment also was 
roughly one-half between the three academic years preceding Leg-Reg and the six years after 
it was introduced. At both schools, Administrative Law was offered fall and spring semesters 
in all or most years prior to Leg-Reg, but in only one semester for the years following 
Leg-Reg. In addition, enrollment varies based on the identity of particular professors. At 
Harvard, the decline was just under one-third between the two academic years preceding 
Leg-Reg and the first six years following its introduction. Administrative Law enrollment at 
Columbia has not been affected by the introduction of Leg-Reg as one of a small number 
of 1L elective options. In contrast to Fordham and Vanderbilt, Columbia continues to offer 
Administrative Law in both fall and spring semesters; like those two schools, year-to-year 
variations in enrollment are affected by the professor teaching the course. Data for all four 
law schools are on file with the author. See also Gluck, supra note 7, at 33-34 and Figure 20 
(reporting mixed results from eight law schools regarding whether Administrative Law 
enrollments increased or decreased following addition of a required Leg-Reg course).
78. Enrollment in Administrative Law for 2008-09 through 2011-12 (the last four years when 
upper-level students had no exposure to Leg-Reg) averaged 79 students per year out of some 
1,000 upper-level students enrolled in a given two-year period. At Harvard, Administrative 
Law enrollment for the two years prior to introduction of a Leg-Reg 1L requirement averaged 
just over 60 percent: 345 students per year out of some 1,100 upper-level students enrolled in 
a given two-year period. Id.
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reducing upper-level enrollments in a full Administrative Law course from 20 
percent to 10 percent. 
Faculty may seek to minimize or even reverse the decline in Administrative 
Law enrollment through closer coordination between the two subjects. In 
order to encourage more students to view Leg-Reg as an appetite-whetting 
introduction to Administrative Law, Leg-Reg professors might explain to their 
students in some detail the types of issues omitted from the 1L course, and 
why the specialized Administrative Law course is important as a follow-up 
area of study. Presenting this explanation—and perhaps even distributing a 
current Administrative Law syllabus—is more likely to be persuasive if Leg-
Reg faculty are on the same page as to what they are and are not covering 
within the administrative law subject area. Accordingly, coordination is at 
least as important here as for Constitutional Law.
Requiring Leg-Reg or Leg also may result in fewer students enrolling in 
upper-level legislation-related courses, or in fewer such courses being offered. 
At the same time, as Abbe Gluck documents, a number of law schools requiring 
Leg-Reg or Leg had no course in this field before the requirement.79 Moreover, 
several schools that added a required course also have added a new upper-
level course: in legislative drafting, state and local government, or theories of 
statutory interpretation.80 And at least one school—Ohio State—offers a diverse 
set of experiential learning options at the upper-level, building on its first-
year foundation in legislation.81 These examples suggest that the ripple effect 
of a required first-year course may be harder to anticipate in the relatively 
new area of legislation when compared with more heavily charted fields like 
administrative law or constitutional law.
Finally, there may be an interest in coordinating Leg-Reg with 1L research 
and writing courses. At Fordham, the four-credit Leg-Reg course includes 
two take-home graded writing assignments during the semester. Typically, 
one addresses a statutory interpretation problem and one a regulatory process 
issue. The faculty included this writing requirement in an effort to supplement 
and enrich the first-year writing experience, and the timing of assignments 
requires coordination with parallel assignments being undertaken in a stand-
alone Research and Writing course. For law schools that do not incorporate a 
writing component for Leg-Reg, there is the possibility of coordination with 
at least some Legal Writing sections to offer a topic that can build upon or 
reinforce learning experiences during the Leg-Reg course, including helping 
to promote the non-court-oriented skill set that lawyers need to develop.
79. See Gluck, supra note 7, at 141-142 and Figure 11 (identifying Wake Forest, Fordham, Houston, 
and Case Western Reserve among the 16 respondents that added a required course). 
80. See id. (identifying Harvard, Wake Forest, and Fordham from the group of 16 respondents).
81. See Rudesill et al., supra note 28, at 86-94 (Part IIB). The centerpiece of Ohio State’s upper-
level offerings is a legislation clinic in which students work directly with state legislative 
leaders and their staffs. Given that approximately 40 law schools are located in state capitals, 
there would seem to be considerable room for growth with respect to this type of clinic 
structure.
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B. General Concerns
Although there are doubtless other concerns of a more general nature, two 
are worthy of mention in this context.
Communication Among Sufficient Numbers of Committed Faculty. It can be rewarding 
to design and implement a new required course, but the chances for success are 
higher if the enterprise is a genuinely collective one. A cooperative planning 
approach has special resonance for Leg-Reg, given that integration of its 
two distinct component parts and coordination of coverage with professors 
from other courses are ongoing responsibilities. In addition, the anxiety of 
1Ls in facing a new type of subject places a premium on advance planning to 
achieve a relatively uniform approach. In established common law courses like 
Property, faculty interests or areas of specialization often result in considerable 
variation: Some professors may focus heavily on intellectual property issues, 
others on landlord-tenant law, still others on zoning. Students tend not to 
question such variations because Property is accepted as a traditional 1L 
requirement. By contrast, Leg-Reg is a recent arrival on the 1L scene and 
still a minority presence in law schools. Substantial variations in coverage 
or approach are more likely to trigger critical scrutiny from anxious student 
consumers. Accordingly, it is worth striving for greater than usual levels of 
communication and coordination among faculty teaching the Leg-Reg course.
In terms of faculty numbers, my experience at two law schools suggests 
that the “bench” for a Leg-Reg course should include at least two more 
faculty than will teach the course in any particular year. This level of initial 
commitment provides a cushion given the recurrence of anticipated semester 
leaves and unanticipated administrative demands. If possible, all professors 
teaching the course should be involved in the initial planning and rollout. 
Faculty often migrate to Leg-Reg from having taught heavily statutory and/
or regulatory subjects, as well as from Constitutional Law or Administrative 
Law. For some, the course may be a second calling rather than a primary 
passion. Regardless of their motivation, all participants should understand 
the importance of inculcating in students an essential shift from doctrinal to 
methodological orientation, as well as the need to work at integrating Leg and 
Reg components. Again speaking from experience, these understandings are 
more readily achieved when there is joint planning and design involved. 
The Institutional Politics of Mining for 1L Credits. It may seem obvious that there 
can be no addition of a 1L course without subtraction. A Leg-Reg or Leg 
course of three or four credits means either that other courses must shave a 
credit to accommodate the new arrival or that a different 1L course must be 
removed to the second year. This challenge is heightened by the reality that 
some professors in traditional 1L subjects cannot in good conscience readily 
conceive of reducing (or in some instances reducing a second time) the content 
of their courses. 
The case for Leg-Reg as part  of  first-year legal education has been 
presented at length in Part I. Advocates for change must be respectfully 
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persuasive while prepared to explain in some depth the importance of this 
new addition. Each law school has a different 1L history and culture, and 
every faculty has its own distinct personalities. Solutions to the challenge of 
altering an institutional status quo will have to be tailored to those individual 
circumstances; there is no single or even recommended approach to this 
political reality.
Conclusion
When reviewing the first edition of the Eskridge & Frickey casebook on 
Legislation, Judge Richard Posner observed in 1988 that “the creation and 
interpretation of statutes are now paramount concerns of the legal profession.”82 
Posner lamented the typical law school curriculum’s failure to grapple with 
the legislative process and the difficulties of statutory interpretation, adding 
that upper-level statutory courses “often treat the legislature as a black box out 
of which a text somehow emerges, and treat interpretation as a straightforward 
process of making the statute conform to some reasonable (the instructor’s?) 
conception of its purposes.”83 He concluded that the new casebook, 
combining practical and theoretical materials on the legislative process with 
in-depth exposure to statutory interpretation across many fields of law, “has 
the potential to alter the law school curriculum.”84
More than twenty-five years later, the alteration predicted or hoped for by 
Posner has yet to be fully realized. This article has sought to establish that 
the arguments in favor of a first-year Leg-Reg course—practical, doctrinal 
and pedagogical—are separately substantial and collectively compelling. The 
presence of such a required course retains the potential to reshape perceptions 
and beliefs about legal practice and our separation of powers structure for the 
next generation of attorneys.
We may be approaching a tipping point. A growing number of law 
schools—public and private, elite and non-elite—have added Leg-Reg or 
Leg as a first-year requirement. Casebooks have proliferated and professors 
entering the field now have a range of worthy choices comparable to those 
available for other first-year courses.85 Obstacles remain that ought not to 
be minimized, including assuring sufficient faculty investment, overcoming 
82. Richard A. Posner, Book Review: Cases and Materials on Legislation: Statutes and the Creation of Public 
Policy, 74 va. L. rev. 1567, 1567 (1988).
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. See, e.g., LiSa SchULtz BreSSman et aL.,the regULatory State (2d ed. 2013); wiLLiam n. 
eSkridge Jr., et aL., caSeS and materiaLS on LegiSLation and regULation: StatUteS 
and the creation of pUBLic poLicy (5th ed. 2014); wiLLiam n. eSkridge Jr. et aL., 
StatUteS, regULationS, and interpretation: LegiSLation and adminiStration in the 
repUBLic of StatUteS (2014); LiSa heinzerLing & mark v. tUShnet, the regULatory 
and adminiStrative State: materiaLS, caSeS, commentS (2006); John f. manning & 
matthew c. StephenSon, LegiSLation and regULation (2d ed. 2013); aBner J. mikva & 
eric Lane, LegiSLative proceSS (3d ed. 2009).  
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student uneasiness, and adjusting credits and coverage for other courses. In 
the end, though, circumventing those obstacles seems less a narrow path for 
the aspirationally virtuous than a necessary route for legal education.
